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Key findings
Higher education is associated with greater geographical mobility.
• At age 27, around 35% of graduates and 15% of non-graduates have moved away from the
travel to work area (TTWA) where they lived at age 16.
• Around two-fifths of the difference in mobility between graduates and non-graduates can be
explained by differences in their background characteristics, such as socio-economic status,
prior educational attainment and area of origin. All else equal, graduates are 10 percentage
points more likely to have moved by age 27 than non-graduates.
• Graduates of more selective universities are more mobile, even controlling for background
characteristics and subject choice.
Graduates move to places with better labour market opportunities.
• Graduates tend to move to large cities, especially to London. Around a quarter of graduates
who move go to London. In contrast, non-graduates do not disproportionately move to
London and other large cities.
• In general, places with high average earnings attract graduates through migration. Gradu-
ates who grew up in places with low average earnings are more likely to move away.
• For a given level of average earnings, cities attract and retain more graduates than other
areas. In addition to London, Brighton, Bristol and Leeds all gain large numbers of graduates
through migration.
• By enabling people to move to labour markets that offer better career opportunities, higher
education appears to reduce inequality of opportunity between people who grow up in dif-
ferent areas.
Ethnic minorities and those from low socio-economic backgrounds are less likely to move, and
the effect of higher education on mobility is much weaker for these groups.
• People from the bottom socio-economic status (SES) quintile are 16 percentage points less
likely to have moved by age 27 than people from the top SES quintile, though most of this
difference can be explained by differences in prior attainment and other background charac-
teristics.
• Young adults of Indian and Pakistani ethnicity are around 7 percentage points less likely to
have moved by age 27 than White British people, even controlling for differences in back-
ground characteristics.
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• Higher education appears to have a much smaller impact on mobility for low SES and ethnic
minority groups. All else equal, young people from the poorest families are only around 4
percentage points more likely to move if they graduate from university. Black and Asian
graduates are no more mobile than Black and Asian non-graduates.
• Of those who do move, low-SES graduates are less likely to move to major cities than grad-
uates from higher-SES backgrounds, even controlling for background characteristics.
Graduates gain higher earnings from moving.
• On average, male graduates who move earn 10% more at age 27 than otherwise similar
graduates who do not move. For women, the estimated gain to moving is 4%.
• Estimated ’moving premiums’ are very similar across SES and ethnic groups, with the ex-
ception of Asian women, for whom movers earn less than stayers.
• There is large variation in moving premiums across subjects. Moving is associated with little
or no gain in earnings (controlling for background characteristics) in nursing, education and
social care, but very large gains among graduates of law, technology, languages, business
and economics – particularly for graduates who move to London.
• This suggests that moving to certain areas might be necessary to take full advantage of the
returns to some degrees.
Patterns of mobility exacerbate regional inequality in skills.
• Rates of higher education participation vary hugely across the country. Less than 20% of
people born in the late 1980s who grew up in Grimsby and Wisbech went on to get degrees,
compared with over 40% of those from Tunbridge Wells and High Wycombe.
• Many cities that gain large numbers of graduates through migration – such as London,
Brighton, Leeds and Bristol – already have relatively high levels of higher education par-
ticipation.
• In contrast, many places with low levels of higher education participation, such as Grimsby
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1 Introduction
Economic opportunities vary across the country, with London and other cities offering greater
prospects for career progression (Gordon, Champion and Coombes, 2015; Social Mobility Com-
mission, 2017). Prospects for social mobility for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds
are also higher in some areas than others (Bell, Blundell and Machin, 2019; Carneiro et al., 2020).
As such, moving to an area that offers better opportunities can be a way for individuals to move
up in life (Papoutsaki et al., 2020).
Previous research has found that graduates are more mobile than non-graduates, and that
those who move experience better employment outcomes (Faggian, McCann and Sheppard, 2007;
Kidd, O’Leary and Sloane, 2017; Papoutsaki et al., 2020). To the extent that the relationship is
causal, higher education could enable people to access opportunities in affluent areas, and thus
reduce inequality of opportunity between people who grow up in different areas. However, if
some groups – for example, those from low-income backgrounds or certain ethnicities – are less
able or willing to move, differences in geographic mobility could exacerbate inequalities. Patterns
of mobility could also exacerbate spatial disparities in skills and thus increase regional inequality.
In this report, we study the link between higher education, geographical mobility and out-
comes for individuals and regions. First, we examine whether higher education is associated with
greater geographical mobility even when we control for confounding factors, such as the fact that
graduates tend to be wealthier and have higher educational attainment. We examine how mobil-
ity – and the relationship between higher education and mobility – differs across socio-economic
and ethnic groups. Second, we consider whether graduates do indeed seem to be ‘moving to op-
portunity’ by analysing the types of areas graduates move to and from and the earnings gains
associated with moving. Third, we consider the effect of mobility patterns on regional inequality.
We make use of a novel administrative dataset that links school records, higher education
records and early-career earnings, referred to as the Longitudinal Education Outcomes (LEO)
dataset. The LEO data have previously been used to estimate returns to higher education (Belfield
et al., 2017, 2018; Britton et al., 2020a,b; Britton, Dearden and Waltmann, 2021). Crucially, we add
to this a new linkage that includes information on geographical location of people after they leave
education. This facilitates this first extensive study of the geographical mobility of graduates in
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the UK.
The LEO dataset allows us to expand on previous research in a number of ways. It contains
information on prior educational attainment and background characteristics, which allows us to
control for a rich set of confounding factors when examining the relationships between higher
education and mobility and between mobility and subsequent earnings. The sample size is much
larger than previous datasets that have been used to study graduate mobility in the UK, such
as the Labour Force Survey or the Destination of Leavers from Higher Education survey. This
means that we are able to study moves at a more granular level than previous research – looking
at moves across travel to work areas rather than government office regions – and investigate how
effects differ across demographic groups, subjects and universities.
We find that higher education is associated with greater mobility, even controlling for differ-
ences in background characteristics between graduates and non-graduates. Graduates who move
tend to move to London and other affluent cities, away from more deprived areas. Those who
move experience large gains in earnings relative to otherwise similar graduates who stay in their
area of origin. This suggests that higher education does indeed allow individuals to move to
opportunity.
However, effects vary substantially across groups. Those from lower socio-economic back-
grounds and ethnic minorities are less likely to move overall, and the effect of higher education on
mobility is much weaker for these groups. Low-income graduates who do move are less likely to
move to big cities, and many ethnic minority graduates move away from London. As result, while
graduate mobility appears to reduce inequality of opportunity between individuals who grow up
in different areas, it may exacerbate inequalities between socio-economic and ethnic groups.
Finally, the patterns of mobility we observe have profound implications for spatial inequality.
Cities such as London, Bristol and Brighton, which already have high rates of higher education
participation, further gain graduates through migration. In contrast, graduates leave places such
as Grimsby and Wisbech, where higher education participation is already low. Moving patterns
concentrate skills in affluent cities and result in a brain drain from the North and coastal areas,
exacerbating regional inequalities.
The report is set out as follows. Section 2 describes the data and measures we use. Section 3
discusses patterns of mobility and how these vary by graduate status, background characteristics,
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subject and university. Section 4 looks at where graduates move to and from, and estimates their




We use a set of linked administrative datasets which include:
• school records from the National Pupil Database (NPD);
• university records from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA);
• earnings records from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC);
• home address records from the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).
These data are linked for all students who attended school in England and took their GCSE
(age 16) exams from 2002 onwards.1 The latest HMRC and DWP data we currently have access to
are from the 2016/17 tax year, hence our oldest cohort – those who took their GCSEs in 2002 – will
be approximately 30 in the last year of our data.2 In order to focus on as late an age as possible
while having sufficient sample sizes for robust analysis, we pool the four oldest cohorts (GCSE
cohorts 2002–05) and focus on mobility at age 27, which is the oldest age at which we observe all
four of these cohorts in our data.3
We discuss our main background and prior attainment measures, as well as the newly linked
DWP address records, below. More detail on each of the NPD, HESA and HMRC datasets is
1The NPD is hard-linked to HESA through a unique individual identifier. It is linked to HMRC records based on a
fuzzy match on name, postcode and date of birth. Match rates to HMRC are typically around 95%, although they are
lower for women and for some ethnic minority groups.
2Individuals in this cohort are mostly born between 1 September 1985 and 31 August 1986. Students could be born
outside this period if they skipped or resat a year, but this is uncommon.
3As shown in Britton et al. (2020b), lifetime earnings profiles vary considerably between graduates and non-
graduates, and between graduates of different groups, so differences in early-career returns to degrees do not fully
reflect differences in lifetime returns. It is possible that the differential patterns of mobility and attendant differences
in earnings that we identify in this report may also not fully reflect lifetime differences. However, the evidence we
present in Section 3 suggests that, if anything, differences in mobility between groups grow with age. The gains from
moving we find in Section 4 are similarly likely to understate the lifetime gains, as other work has shown that those
who work in cities early in their careers acquire more valuable work experience (Roca and Puga, 2017) and experience
higher wage growth later in life (D’Costa and Overman, 2014).
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provided in our previous reports (Belfield et al., 2018; Britton et al., 2020b).
2.2 Prior attainment measures and other background characteristics
The school records contain rich information on the student’s test scores at ages 11, 16 and 18,
as well as other background characteristics. We make use of these data to control for relevant
differences between groups. Specifically, we separately control for age 11 (Key Stage 2) test scores
in English, maths and science; age 16 (Key Stage 4) scores in English, maths and overall; and age
18 (Key Stage 5) scores for vocational subjects and overall.4 To adjust for variation in background
characteristics, we control for socio-economic background, ethnicity, free school meals and special
needs status, English as an additional language, and – for university graduates – whether they
entered university after age 18.
Unfortunately, we do not observe parental income directly, so we need to infer socio-economic
status (SES) based on free school meals status and local area deprivation measures. Following
previous research in this area (e.g. Chowdry et al., 2013) and our own previous work with the
LEO data (e.g. Belfield et al., 2018), we generate a continuous SES index based on these measures
using principal components analysis. We then divide this continuous index into quintiles that
range from most deprived to least deprived.5
Our measure of the ethnicity of students is taken from the NPD. We use the information from
the school census at age 16 and group students into 10 broad ethnic groups: White British, White
Other, Black African, Black Caribbean, Black Other, Bangladeshi, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani and
Other.
2.3 Location data
The school census included in the NPD provides us with the lower layer super output area (LSOA)
of residence at age 16 for each student. Unfortunately, the school census information is only avail-
able for students in state schools, which means that we are not able to include the approximately
4To handle cases where no test scores are observed from age 11 or age 18 exams, we set the score to zero; in each
case, we add an indicator variable to account for the effect of a missing score. Individuals with missing age 16 scores
are dropped from the sample.
5We drop the control for free school meals in all cases where we report the effects of SES quintile in order to retain
an intuitive interpretation of these effects.
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7% of students who attended private secondary schools in any of our analysis.
To obtain individuals’ place of residence in adulthood, we make use of the address records
from the DWP Customer Information Spine (CIS). Individuals are added to the DWP CIS when
a child benefit claim is made for them, at which point their family address is also recorded in
the database. If their parents did not claim child benefit, an individual is instead added to the
CIS when their National Insurance number is generated at age 15. This address is then updated
throughout an individual’s life as they claim benefits or start work. Addresses recorded by em-
ployers on their HR systems are fed through to the DWP, which then updates the recorded address
on the CIS. One concern is that young adults who move around frequently might keep their par-
ents’ address for all formal work- and tax-related correspondence, even if they live independently.
In this case, the DWP CIS will record their parents’ address and mismeasure their residence. The
next section discusses this issue in more detail, quantifying the likely extent of mismeasurement
and what this implies for our analysis.
Live regional data were added to the DWP CIS in October 2012, when the dataset was popu-
lated with individuals’ known address at that point in time as well as the start date of that address.
After October 2012, all changes in address were recorded and retained in the dataset. This means
that we will only have an address for an individual prior to 2012 if they still lived at that address in
October 2012. As our data run until the 2016/17 tax year, we therefore have five years of complete
address records. If an individual moved during a tax year, we only observe the address at which
the individual was registered for most of the tax year.
While we know where individuals live at age 16 and in adulthood at the LSOA level, this
unit of analysis is too small for robust analysis. As we are primarily interested in individuals’
career prospects, we aggregate up the more than 30,000 LSOAs to around 150 travel to work areas
(TTWAs). TTWAs are defined by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) using census data to
approximate self-contained local labour markets, such that at least 75% of people living in an area
also work in the area, and that also at least 75% of those who work in the area live in the area. As
a result, these areas vary in size across the country, being larger in places where people commute
further to work.
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2.4 Misrecording of post-graduation locations
As mentioned above, one potential downside of the location data from the DWP CIS is that some
young adults may not update their records to reflect their actual address – for example, because
they prefer to receive work- and tax-related correspondence at their parents’ address. It is impos-
sible to know precisely how accurate the DWP CIS information is, as no perfect data source exists
that can reveal where young people actually live. In this section, we attempt to get a rough sense
of the scale of potential misrecording by comparing our administrative measures with information
from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) on the share of people living with their parents.6
The key measure that we look at is the share of people living with their parents in each year
after leaving full-time education.7 While we cannot observe directly whether people live with their
parents in our administrative data, we can observe whether their recorded address is in the same
LSOA as when they were 16. As LSOAs are very small and people move much less frequently
in middle age than when they are younger, the share of people in the administrative data whose
addresses are in the same LSOA as at age 16 is likely to be a good approximation to the share of
those whose address is recorded as their parents’ home.
Using a simple model, we then estimate what share of people must be retaining their age 16
address in the DWP data based on the discrepancies in the shares of people who appear to be
living with their parents according to the two data sources.8 Our findings suggest that around
30% of young adults who have moved out of their parental home may not update their address
to reflect this. This implies that the DWP address data used in this report would underestimate
the true number of movers by around 30%. Other features of the data such as moving rates across
regions and trends in moving rates across ages suggest that this is likely to be an upper bound for
the true scale of misrecording in the DWP location data. In the rest of the report, we proceed as
if there was no misrecording, because any adjustment would need to rely on strong assumptions
about which individuals misrecord their address (for example, by assuming that misrecording is
random). However, we highlight the potential effects of misrecording on our findings in the text
throughout and present alternative versions of a selected set of figures in Appendix A3, where we
6It may be possible to improve on this in future work using confidential census data.
7Note that this is different from the rest of the report, where we report results by age.
8Details of our model and estimation procedures are given in Appendix A2.
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make a simple adjustment based on the estimated misrecording rates to give the reader a sense of
the potential scale of the problem.
3 Who moves?
We start by describing who moves, using a simple measure of mobility: whether a person lives
in a different area as a young adult from when they were in their final year of compulsory sec-
ondary school. We first investigate how this measure of mobility varies by graduate status, socio-
economic background and ethnicity. Focusing on graduates, we then consider how mobility varies
by the university they attended and the subject they studied.9
3.1 Differences in mobility by background characteristics
Previous research has highlighted the fact that graduates are much more geographically mobile
than non-graduates, especially at the start of their careers (Faggian, McCann and Sheppard, 2007;
Bosquet and Overman, 2019; Papoutsaki et al., 2020). We start by confirming this result for our
dataset in Figure 1. The figure plots the share of people living in a different travel to work area
from when they were 16 by age, gender and graduate status. We see that the share living outside
their area of origin increases over time for all groups, but much more so for graduates.10
For both men and women, only 20% of non-graduates live in a different TTWA at age 30 from
where they lived at age 16, while roughly 40% of graduates do. There are almost no discernible
differences by gender. As shown in Figure A2 in Appendix A1, the same patterns also hold when
only looking at moves to London, with graduates much more likely to move to London than non-
graduates, and few differences between men and women.11
9We generally consider individuals ‘graduates’ if they have obtained a standard undergraduate degree by the be-
ginning of the tax year, and all others ‘non-graduates’. We exclude from the analysis those for which we observe a
postgraduate degree but not an undergraduate degree (but retain those for whom we observe an integrated Master’s
degree, which we count as an undergraduate degree). We also exclude individuals that we observe to be in full time
education at any time during the respective tax year, and non-graduate part-time students in the tax year in which
they graduate. The main rationale behind these sample restrictions is that the status of individuals falling into these
catgories in a given tax year is either on the border between ‘graduate’ and ‘non-graduate’ or otherwise sui generis. One
caveat is that our data on higher education only extends to the 2015/16 academic year, so we cannot exclude those in
full time education in the 2016/17 tax year.
10Figure A15 in Appendix A3 is the equivalent figure adjusting for misrecording using the parameters estimated
from our misrecording model. True overall mobility is likely to be somewhat higher than indicated in Figure 1, but the
large differences between graduates and non-graduates appear to be roughly unaffected by misrecording.
11One small difference emerges between graduate men and women at ages 27–30: graduate women at that age are
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Note: Includes data from the 2002–09 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2012/13 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education are dropped,
and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time.
Focusing on graduates, we see that those from higher socio-economic backgrounds are much
more likely to move than those from more deprived backgrounds. This is shown in Figure 2,
which plots mobility rates by socio-economic status among graduates only.12 Just over half of
those from the highest SES quintile still live in their area of origin at age 30, while nearly 80% of
those from the lowest SES group do. Notably, the curves for graduates in the lowest SES group
look remarkably similar to the non-graduate groups from Figure 1. Again, patterns of mobility
look very similar across men and women.
slightly less likely to live in London than graduate men. This may be related to the fact that women tend to have
children at slightly younger ages than men, and families with children may be more likely to move out of London.
12As described in Section 2, SES is based on information on free school meal eligibility and the local area where the
individual lived in their final year of secondary school (the school year they turned 16).
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Note: Includes data from the 2002–09 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2012/13 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education are dropped,
and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time. SES quintiles are set based on the whole
population. Therefore, there are fewer people in the bottom quintile group than the top quintile group here as we are
only looking at graduates (and higher SES groups are much more likely to go to university).
There are also large differences in the mobility of graduates by ethnicity. Figure 3 plots the
share of graduates not living in their area of origin at age 27 by ethnic group and gender. We focus
on outcomes at age 27, which allows us to pool across the four cohorts in our data and use a larger
sample.13
Figure 3 shows that Black and Asian graduates are considerably less likely to have moved by
age 27 than White graduates. There are also very striking gender differences across ethnic groups.
Although male White British graduates are as likely to have left their area of origin as female White
British graduates, male Asian graduates are much less mobile than their female counterparts. In
13Figure A1 in Appendix A1 shows that mobility patterns are very similar across cohorts.
13
fact, some of these groups are extremely immobile, with only around 5% of Bangladeshi male
graduates living in a different TTWA at 27 from when they were 16.
Figure 3: Share of graduates living in a different TTWA at age 27 by ethnicity
 overall womenoverall men 
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Note: Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education are dropped,
and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time.
While the patterns presented above are interesting in their own right, it is important to em-
phasise that some of the differences between groups may be driven by factors other than the
specific characteristic being investigated. For example, we know that graduates typically come
from wealthier families and do better in school, which could make them more geographically
mobile regardless of whether they went to university. Similarly, lower SES groups have lower
prior attainment on average, which might make them less geographically mobile regardless of
their socio-economic background. They also tend to come from urban areas and are therefore less
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likely to need to move to access graduate jobs.
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Estimate 95% CI Raw difference
Note: Shows coefficients from a linear probability regression model with 2,193,100 observations. The model regresses
an indicator for ‘moving’ – defined as living in a different TTWA at age 27 from at age 16 – on all of the observable
characteristics shown in the figure, prior attainment, TTWA of origin fixed effects and other controls listed in Section
2.2. The reference categories are female, non-graduate, highest SES and White British. Includes data from the 2002–
05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Individuals observed to be in full-time education are
dropped, and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time.
We attempt to disentangle these conflating factors to get a better sense of the drivers of mobility
in Figure 4. It shows the relationship between demographic characteristics (gender, graduate
status, SES and ethnicity) and mobility, holding all other observable characteristics constant. This
is based on a regression model that includes all these factors, plus a rich set of prior attainment
measures and area of origin.14 We note that although we control for a wide range of observable
14Specifically, we run a linear probability model that regresses a binary indicator of whether an individual lives in a
different TTWA at age 27 from at age 16 on all of the observable characteristics shown in the figure, prior attainment,
TTWA of origin fixed effects and other controls listed in Section 2.2.
15
characteristics, there will be other differences we do not observe. For example, perhaps people
who choose to go to university (which we observe) are also those who have low psychological
attachment to their local area (which we do not observe). In this example, we would attribute
higher mobility among these individuals to them having been to university, and so overstate the
effect of higher education on mobility. While we do not claim that there are no biases of this type
(which would be required to warrant a causal interpretation of our results), we discuss results
using causal language – talking about the effect of higher education on mobility, for example – to
give the reader a sense of what we are trying to approximate.
The figure highlights some important results. We see that controlling for other characteristics
reduces the difference in mobility between graduates and non-graduates by 40%, from 16 percent-
age points to 10 percentage points. That is, around two-fifths of the raw difference in mobility
between graduates and non-graduates can be explained by differences in their socio-economic
backgrounds, prior attainment, TTWA of origin fixed effects and the other characteristics listed
in Section 2.2. However, the fact that graduates are still substantially more likely to move than
non-graduates, after adjusting for differences in background characteristics, is important. It sug-
gests that going to university might make people more mobile – something that has also been
found in causal studies of mobility outside the UK (Malamud and Wozniak, 2012; Böckerman and
Haapanen, 2013).
Controlling for confounding factors significantly reduces socio-economic gaps in mobility,
with those from the bottom SES quintile being 5 percentage points less likely to move than simi-
lar individuals from the top SES quintile (the omitted category in the regression). This compares
with a raw difference of 16 percentage points. The implication is that the vast majority of socio-
economic gaps in mobility can be explained by factors other than SES.
Differences by ethnicity are also attenuated, which reflects the fact that people from most ethnic
minorities are more likely to be from low SES backgrounds, have lower academic attainment on
average, and are more likely to have grown up in London and other cities, and therefore have
less need to move. However, large differences still remain. Individuals from Indian and Pakistani
backgrounds are around 7 percentage points less likely to have moved by age 27 than White British
individuals, who are the omitted category in the regression. Those from Black, Bangladeshi and
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Chinese ethnicities are around 2 percentage points less likely to move.15
These regression results suggest that going to university is associated with higher early-career
mobility. Figure 5 investigates whether this is true for people from all backgrounds by showing
how the relationship between higher education and mobility varies across demographic groups.
We again regress ‘moving’ on controls including gender, SES, ethnicity, prior attainment and
TTWA of origin, but now add interactions of graduate status with gender, SES and ethnicity in
three separate regressions. The coefficients on these interactions, shown in Figure 5, tell us how
more likely graduates in each group are to have moved TTWA by age 27, relative to non-graduates
in the same group, holding other characteristics constant. We interpret this as an approximation
of how going to university affects the mobility of different sub-populations.
15Interestingly, the raw difference for ethnic Chinese students is actually higher than the estimate. This largely reflects
the exceptionally high educational attainment of this group.
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Estimate 95% CI Raw difference
Note: Shows coefficients from three linear probability regression models with 2,193,100 observations. Results shown
are the coefficients on the interaction terms of the gender, SES or ethnicity shown and a dummy for being a graduate.
Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Individuals observed to be
in full-time education are dropped, and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time.
We see that some interesting SES gaps emerge, with those from the highest SES group being
around 12 percentage points more likely to move if they graduate from higher education, while
the equivalent number for the lowest SES group is just 4 percentage points. There is a roughly
linear relationship in between (which can be seen from the circles in the figure). This is quite a
stark difference, as it holds all other factors such as initial location, ethnicity and prior attainment
constant. It suggests that higher education may have less of an effect on mobility for students
coming from poorer backgrounds than it does for their richer peers. The overall result of a 10
percentage point boost in mobility for graduates appears to be largely driven by graduates from
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wealthier backgrounds, with much smaller effects for graduates from poorer families.16
There are also striking differences by ethnicity. White British graduates are 12 percentage
points more likely to move than White British non-graduates, holding all else equal. Yet for
those from Black and Asian backgrounds, the estimated gap in moving between graduates and
non-graduates is close to zero or in some cases even negative. Taken at face value, this would
imply that higher education does not increase – or even reduces – the geographical mobility of
non-White ethnic groups.17
3.2 Differences in mobility by type of higher education degree
The relationship between higher education and mobility also depends on where and what grad-
uates studied. Figure 6 shows how mobility patterns among graduates vary by the type of in-
stitution they attended. We see that graduates from the most selective group of universities, the
Russell Group, are far more mobile than graduates from the least selective group of universities.
Again, there are almost no differences between genders.
16As shown in Figure A4 in Appendix A1, both graduates and non-graduates from poorer backgrounds are less mo-
bile than those from wealthier backgrounds, but the gradient is much steeper for graduates. As a result, the difference
in mobility between graduates and non-graduates is much larger for higher SES groups.
17For a comparison of graduate and non-graduate mobility rates of different ethnic groups, see Figure A5 in Ap-
pendix A1.
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Note: Includes data from the 2002–09 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2012/13 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are
dropped, and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time. A list of universities in each of the
four categories can be found in Britton et al. (2020c).
Figure 7 shows that graduate mobility also varies a lot by subject (this time focusing on mo-
bility by age 27), with around half of veterinary science, medicine and physics graduates living in
a different TTWA by age 27, compared with around a quarter of social care, pharmacology and
education graduates. This is not surprising and provides a useful sense-check of our data. For
example, we know that medical students are posted all around the country to work during their
20s. Jobs in education, pharmacology and social care are also available throughout the country, so
graduates of these subjects have less need to move to find work that is a good fit for their skills.
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Note: Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are
dropped, and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time.
As with the previous section, it is likely that some of the variation in raw mobility rates across
institutions and subjects is driven by other factors. In Figures 8 and 9, we investigate the relation-
ship between geographical mobility and institution and subject of study, holding other observable
characteristics constant. Again, we include controls for prior attainment, area of origin and other
characteristics as listed in Section 2.2.
Figure 8 shows that even when we control for observable differences between students, early-
career mobility varies substantially across universities. All else equal, graduates of Oxford, Cam-
bridge, and the Central School of Speech and Drama (the three universities with the largest esti-
mated effect on mobility) are nearly 25 percentage points more likely to have moved by age 27
21
than graduates of Newman University (the university with the smallest effect on mobility). There
is a positive correlation between the selectivity of the university (measured by the mean GCSE
score of its intake) and the mobility of its graduates, even controlling for prior attainment and
other factors. This could reflect the impact of universities on students’ career ambitions and op-
portunities, either directly or through peer effects. That said, selectivity could also be acting as
a proxy for unobserved differences in ability or motivation that are not captured by measures of
prior attainment, which could independently affect mobility.
Figure 8: Mobility and university selectivity
Oxford University
University of Cambridge
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Note: We regress a dummy for living in a different TTWA at age 27 from at age 16 on demographic characteristics,
prior attainment, area of origin, subject and institution of study. The figure shows the estimates of the impact of each
university on mobility relative to a base case, which is Anglia Ruskin University. Only graduates from the 2002–05
GCSE cohorts are included in the regression. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped.
The University of Suffolk is excluded from this graph, because it only started accepting students for the 2007/08 aca-
demic year, potentially distorting our results. r2 is the proportion of the variance in the estimated mobility effects that
is predictable by the mean GCSE score of a university’s students and an intercept (this is the square of the Pearson
correlation coefficient).
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When we look at differences by subject, however, we find that most of the raw variation in
mobility across subjects is explained by other factors. This is shown in Figure 9, which plots both
raw differences in mobility and estimates of mobility differences by subject when we hold other
factors constant. For the vast majority of subjects, differences in mobility estimates are very small
– within a few percentage points of one another. There are a couple of exceptions to this, namely
education, which has particularly low levels of mobility, and medicine and veterinary sciences,
which both have particularly high levels of mobility.










































































































































































Note: We regress a dummy for living in a different TTWA at age 27 from at age 16 on demographic characteristics, prior
attainment, area of origin, subject and institution of study. The figure shows the estimates of the impact of each subject
on mobility relative to a base case, which is agriculture. Only graduates from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts are included
in the regression. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped.
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4 Do graduates move to opportunity?
The previous section found that graduates are considerably more likely to move than non-graduates,
and that this holds true even once we allow for the fact that graduates are typically from wealthier
families and have higher prior attainment. In this section, we focus on the types of moves grad-
uates are making. We are particularly interested in whether they appear to be moving in order
to find job opportunities and boost their earnings, as previous research suggests (Social Mobil-
ity Commission, 2017; Papoutsaki et al., 2020). We examine what kinds of places graduates are
moving to, what kinds of places they are leaving, and what they gain from moving – drawing out
differences by background characteristics throughout.
4.1 Heading for major cities
Figure 10 describes where graduates move to and from at a high level. We consider moves be-
tween four types of areas: London, major cities, other cities (based on the Centre for Cities clas-
sification), and other TTWAs which we loosely call ‘rural’ areas. We class a TTWA as a city if it
corresponds to a Primary Urban Area (PUA) listed by the Centre for Cities (2014).18 We define the
10 largest cities in England according to the Centre for Cities as ’major cities’ (Centre for Cities,
2021). All other areas are classed as ‘rural’, including TTWAs containing towns such as Grimsby
or small cities such as Bath that are not included in the Centre for Cities list. The left-hand panel
of Figure 10 shows the flows of all graduates between ages 16 and 27, while the right-hand panel
focuses only on graduates who move.
The figure shows that graduates tend to move towards London and major cities and away
from rural areas. Among graduates who move, a large proportion (around a quarter) move to
London from all area types. That said, we do see substantial migration between other types of
areas, especially for graduates from smaller cities or rural areas, who are almost as likely to move
to another major city as to London. Put differently, around three-quarters of movers move to areas
other than London, meaning that graduate mobility is by no means a story of everybody flocking
to London.19
18The list of PUAs excludes places (such as Bath) that have official city status but have small populations, and includes
large urban areas without official city status such as Bournemouth.
19Figure A16 in Appendix A3 compares the left-hand panel of Figure 10 with a version adjusting for misrecording in
the administrative data using the estimated parameters of our misrecording model (assuming that all graduate movers
24



















Age 16 Age 27
Graduates who move
Note: The left-hand figure shows the area types where graduates lived at age 16, and compares these with where they
live at age 27, showing the flows of graduates to and from each area type. The right-hand figure only shows origin
and destination area type for graduates who move TTWA between ages 16 and 27. Those observed to be in full-time
education at age 27 are excluded from the chart. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14
to 2016/17 tax years.
In contrast, non-graduates do not disproportionately move to cities. Figure A3 in Appendix A1
shows that the distribution of non-graduates across area types is essentially the same before and
after migration. The tendency of graduates to move to cities, coupled with their higher propensity
to move overall, increases the concentration of graduate skills in cities – something we explore
further in Section 5.
While graduates in general appear to move to opportunity, this is not true for all groups. In
particular, graduates from lower socio-economic backgrounds do not disproportionately move to
cities. Figure 11 shows flows across area types for graduates from the lowest SES quintile only. The
left-hand panel re-emphasises the point that low-SES graduates are not very mobile, often staying
to work in the same or similar areas to where they went to school. The right-hand panel reveals an
interesting fact: among the low-SES graduates who do move, this movement is not dominated by
moving to London and other major cities. In fact, there is a small net flow of low-SES graduates
towards rural areas and smaller cities.
are equally likely to update their records). While misrecording likely leads to some moves being left out from Figure
10, the resulting age 27 distribution is unlikely to be substantially affected.
25
The lower propensity of low-SES graduates to move to major cities can largely be explained
by background characteristics. However, an unexplained gap remains. This is true whether or not
the sample is restricted to those who move.20



















Age 16 Age 27
Lowest SES graduates who move
Note: The left-hand figure shows the area types where graduates lived at age 16, and compares these with where they
live at age 27, showing the flows of graduates to and from each area type. The right-hand figure only shows origin
and destination area type for graduates who move TTWA between ages 16 and 27. Those observed to be in full-time
education at age 27 are excluded from the chart. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14
to 2016/17 tax years.
Ethnic minority graduates are also less likely to move, as shown in Figure 12. Comparing
mover flows in the right-hand panel of this chart with those in Figure 10, we see roughly the same
distribution over destination areas, even though more movers come from London and major cities.
Notably, we see substantial flows out of London towards other types of areas.
However, when we control for background characteristics such as area of origin, prior attain-
ment, HE institution and subject choice, these differences are reversed: comparing graduates with
similar background characteristics, all ethnic minority graduates except South Asian graduates
are actually more likely to move to major cities than White British graduates. This result becomes
even sharper when we also restrict the sample to those who move: movers from all ethnic minority
20Regression results showing differences in the likelihood of moving to a major city for graduates from different
groups are presented in Figure A6. Figure A7 shows results conditional on moving.
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groups are more likely to move to major cities than otherwise similar White British students.
It is worth comparing these findings with those of Papoutsaki et al. (2020). Analysing mi-
gration flows between local authorities, they find that people tend to move between areas with
similar levels of deprivation (as measured by the Index of Multiple Deprivation or IMD), and thus
conclude that ‘internal migration might not be equalising opportunity’. The key difference in our
analysis is that we consider flows between types of local labour markets, and while many parts
of London are classed as highly deprived based on their IMD, we also know that London offers
higher wages and better access to professional jobs (Gibbons, Overman and Pelkonen, 2014; Social
Mobility Commission, 2019). As result, flows from deprived rural areas to deprived parts of Lon-
don would count as moves between similar areas in their analysis, but as moves to opportunity in
ours.



















Age 16 Age 27
BAME graduates who move
Note: The left-hand figure shows the area types where graduates lived at age 16, and compares these with where they
live at age 27, showing the flows of graduates to and from each area type. The right-hand figure only shows origin
and destination area type for graduates who move TTWA between ages 16 and 27. Those observed to be in full-time
education at age 27 are excluded from the chart. ‘BAME graduates’ includes graduates of all ethnicities except White
British and White Other. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years.
The evidence presented in this section, which we expand on in the following sections, shows
that internal migration increases the concentration of graduates in major cities. This suggests
that mobility does in general reduce inequality of opportunity between graduates who grew up in
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different areas – giving those from more deprived areas access to cities with better career oppor-
tunities. However, the relationship appears to be much weaker for people from disadvantaged
groups. Specifically, Figures 11 and 12 show that graduates from lower SES or ethnic minority
backgrounds are less likely to move overall, and when they do, this is often away from London
and other major cities.
4.2 Graduates move to wealthier places
The above figures show that graduates tend to move to London and other major cities. In general,
larger cities offer higher wages and better career prospects (D’Costa and Overman, 2014), which
suggests that graduates may be moving in search of better opportunities. Figure 13 explores this
idea in more detail by plotting the relationship between net graduate migration at the TTWA level
and average pay in the TTWA, taken from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).
The vertical axis plots the change in each TTWA’s graduate share as a result of migration: it is
the difference between the share of young people from the area who go on to get degrees and the
share of young people who end up living in that area who have degrees. For example, looking at
individuals in our four cohorts who lived in London at age 16, 35% went on to become graduates.
But of those from the same cohorts who lived in London at age 27, 44% had a degree. The net gain
in graduates for London is therefore 9 percentage points – shown in the top right corner of Figure
13.
The figure shows a strong positive correlation between the net graduate migration and aver-
age pay in an area. London is the biggest gainer of graduates through migration, and also the
TTWA with the highest average earnings (measured across the whole working-age population).
At the other end of the scale is Northallerton (in North Yorkshire), which is the largest net loser of
graduates, with a change in the graduate share of –11 percentage points as a result of migration. It
is also a relatively low-paid area with mean annual earnings of just £23,000, almost £20,000 lower
than the equivalent figure for London.
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Note: Change in the share of graduates is the percentage point difference between the share of 16-year-olds from the
area who go on to be graduates and the share of 27-year-olds who live in the area who are graduates. Includes data
from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Mean annual pay for each TTWA is the
simple average of reported mean earnings from the 2014 to 2017 vintages of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE). r2 is the proportion of the variance in the change in the graduate share across TTWAs that is predictable by
mean annual pay and an intercept (this is the square of the Pearson correlation coefficient).
The strong positive correlation suggests that graduates tend to move to areas with higher
pay.21 However, the relationship is by no means a perfect correlation, and there are several impor-
tant counterexamples. In general, for a given level of average earnings, cities (in particular, major
cities) are more likely to gain graduates through migration. Brighton, Bristol and Leeds (and, to a
slightly lesser extent, Bath) all gain large numbers of graduates despite not standing out in terms
of average earnings. Falmouth, a town on the Cornish coast and home to Falmouth University, a
21In theory, the same pattern could also be caused by non-graduates moving in the opposite direction. To rule this
out, we have drawn Figure A9 (included in Appendix A1), a version of Figure 13 where we calculate the change in the
graduate share holding the number of non-graduates constant at the age-16 level in each TTWA. The picture is nearly
identical, confirming that the observed patterns are driven by graduate movers.
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former arts college, also gains graduates despite having relatively low average earnings. A num-
ber of other places lose graduates through migration despite having high earnings, such as High
Wycombe and Newbury (both wealthy commuter towns) and Whitehaven (where the Sellafield
nuclear power plant is located). This suggests that the availability of social and cultural amenities
also plays a role in young people’s location decisions, which is consistent with previous research
(Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz, 2001; Clark and Maas, 2015; Papoutsaki et al., 2020).22
4.3 Graduates from poorer places leave
We have established that graduates tend to move towards London and other large cities, and
higher-paid areas more generally. Figure 14 shows that graduates also tend to leave poorer areas.
This figure, which plots the share of graduates who move away from their TTWA of origin by
average earnings in that TTWA, shows a clear negative relationship between how wealthy an area
is and how likely its graduates are to move away. Only 13% of graduates who grow up in London
– the TTWA with the highest pay – leave London by age 27, while around 60% of graduates from
the TTWAs with the lowest pay leave.
22Another factor that likely affects the net gain or loss of graduates in an area is the share of young people from an area
who go to university. All else equal, we would expect areas where more young people go to university to be ‘exporting’
graduates and those where fewer go to university to be ‘importing’ them. However, as shown in Figure 20, there is no
clear empirical relationship between the share of young people from an area who go on to university and whether an
area loses graduates. Areas with a substantial net loss of graduates (in percentage points) include areas with a very
high proportion of young people going to university such as High Wycombe, Tunbridge Wells and Harrogate, but also
areas with very low shares of university attendance such as Grimsby and Wisbech.
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Note: The vertical axis shows the share of graduates who live in a different TTWA at age 27 from their TTWA at age 16.
Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Mean annual pay for each
TTWA is the simple average of reported mean earnings from the 2014 to 2017 vintages of the Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings (ASHE). r2 is the proportion of the variance in the share of graduates who move that is predictable by
mean annual pay and an intercept (this is the square of the Pearson correlation coefficient).
The relationship is particularly striking since we know that pupils from poorer areas tend to
have lower educational attainment, and are therefore less mobile in general. Figure A8 in Ap-
pendix A1 shows that the negative gradient is even steeper, and the correlation stronger, when we
control for differences in prior attainment and other background characteristics.
We see that for a given level of average earnings, cities (in particular, major cities) are less
likely to lose graduates through migration – the mirror image of Figure 13 above. Graduates
from Manchester, Birmingham, Leeds and Bristol are quite a lot less likely to move away than the
average earnings in those places would predict. This could point to the value of social and cultural
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amenities that cities offer young graduates.
4.4 Variation in the graduate premium across areas
So far, we have established that graduates tend to move away from poorer areas towards areas
with higher pay, especially to London and other major cities. This suggests that graduates move
to access better career opportunities. But there is some evidence that this is not the whole story,
as cities such as Brighton and Bristol attract and retain graduates despite not having particularly
high average earnings. Looking at the variation in the graduate earnings premium – the addi-
tional earnings graduates get compared with similar non-graduates23 – in different parts of the
country24 also suggests that there are limits to the extent to which graduates move to opportunity.
If anything, graduates do not move to London as much as we might expect.
The argument is slightly subtle. The graduate earnings premium can be seen as a measure of
the relative demand for graduate skills. If all graduates stayed where they grew up, we would
expect large variation in graduate premiums around the country, as demand for graduate skills
varies dramatically across the country, and firms in areas with high demand for these skills rel-
ative to the supply of graduates would have to raise graduate salaries to attract workers. With
migration, we would expect these differences to be equalised, as graduates move to areas where
their skills are demanded and rewarded, increasing supply. At the extreme, if there were no costs
to moving for either graduates or non-graduates, we would expect graduate premiums to be the
same across the country.
23This is equivalent to the estimated return to higher education. We refer to it as the graduate premium here, in line
with the literature on labour demand and geographical inequality (Dahl, 2002; O’Leary and Sloane, 2005; Walker and
Zhu, 2011).
24Based on where people are living, rather than where they are from.
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Figure 15: Graduate premiums by TTWA









Note: The map plots all 149 English TTWAs included in our analysis. TTWAs straddling two home nations are excluded
from the analysis and therefore not plotted. ‘Graduate premiums’ are calculated using a regression of earnings on a
graduate dummy, interacted with TTWA at age 27, plus controls for background characteristics and school attainment
as listed in Section 2.2, fully interacted with a gender dummy. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from
the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years.
Figure A10 in Appendix A1 suggests that migration does indeed respond to demand – areas
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with higher graduate premiums gain more graduates through migration. However, as Figure 15
shows, large differences in graduate premiums remain across TTWAs.25 In particular, London and
surrounding areas have very high graduate premiums, while estimated premiums in Cornwall,
the North, and the East coast are low or even negative. The existence of such large variations in
graduate premiums around the country suggests that non-wage factors also play a role in people’s
migration decision and/or that there are considerable (economic, social or psychological) costs to
moving.
4.5 Movers earn more than non-movers
The analysis so far suggests that graduates are, at least to some extent, moving to boost their earn-
ings opportunities. We now turn to consider how this bears out in terms of their actual earnings
by asking whether, and how much, graduates typically gain from moving. We note that there
may be other economic gains from moving – for example, higher chances of finding a job or better
access to particular kinds of jobs – that are not captured by differences in earnings (Papoutsaki
et al., 2020).
We start with some simple comparisons in Figure 16, which shows the average earnings of
movers and non-movers, split by graduate status and gender. This shows that in all four cases,
the median earnings of movers at age 27 exceed those of non-movers. The difference is clearly
much larger for graduates than for non-graduates, and similar (in percentage terms) across male
and female graduates. In contrast, non-graduate men who move earn very similar amounts to
those who do not move. The difference for non-graduate women is also smaller than for graduate
women. This suggests that graduates (and especially male graduates) gain more from moving
than non-graduates.
25We calculate the local graduate premium using a regression of earnings on a graduate dummy, interacted with
TTWA at age 27, plus controls for background characteristics and school attainment as listed in Section 2.2, fully inter-
acted with a gender dummy. We note that although we control for a rich set of observable characteristics, there may be
unobservable differences between graduates and non-graduates in different areas that bias our results.
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Note: Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such if they have obtained their degrees before age 27. Individuals observed to be in full-time education
are dropped, and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time. Only includes graduates with
positive earnings.
4.6 The moving premium by background characteristics
Of course, non-movers might be different from movers in other important ways that affect earn-
ings. We therefore investigate what happens to the ‘moving premium’ once we control for ob-
servable differences in the characteristics of movers and non-movers. As with our earlier analysis
of the relationship between higher education and mobility, we use the language of ‘moving pre-
mium’ so as to give the reader a sense of what we are approximating, but do not claim these
are causal effects. Our data allow us to control for a richer set of background characteristics, in-
cluding multiple measures of prior educational attainment, than many previous studies (Kidd,
35
O’Leary and Sloane, 2017; Papoutsaki et al., 2020). Still, there are likely to be factors correlated
with moving that we do not observe – for example, ambition or motivation – that directly affect
earnings and therefore bias our estimates.
With this caveat in mind, Figure 17 shows what happens to the earnings difference between
movers and non-movers when we control for differences in their observable characteristics.26 We
see that even when we control for these differences, graduates who move experience a large ‘mov-
ing premium’. This is especially true for male graduates, for whom movers earn 10% more than
non-movers, all else equal. For women, the estimated premium is smaller at 4%.
These estimates are very large. For example, 10% is substantially higher than the estimated
effect of going to university on earnings for men at age 27 (Belfield et al., 2018). This is especially
notable as any misrecording in the DWP location data will have attenuated these estimates; true
moving premiums may therefore be even higher.
Large earnings premiums at age 27 are also likely to translate into even larger differences
in later life. The reason is that earnings growth among graduates in middle age appears to be
especially high among those who already have high earnings around age 30 (Britton et al., 2020b).
There is also evidence that – controlling for individual differences – those who have experience
working in cities see faster wage growth than those who have only worked in rural areas, even
after they leave the city (D’Costa and Overman, 2014).
The moving premiums we estimate are remarkably stable across different subgroups, particu-
larly for men. There is almost no variation in premiums across SES groups, and very little variation
in the point estimates across ethnicities (some of these estimates are imprecise because of small
sample sizes). Estimated moving premiums for women are also quite stable, with the exception
of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, for whom the premium is negative. One plausible
explanation for this is unobservable differences in who moves: for example, South Asian women
may primarily move for marriage, at the expense of their own career prospects, while women from
other ethnic groups may move to further their careers. Similarly, if there are strong norms against
moving for work in these communities, it is possible that only those who fail to find employment
in their area of origin choose to move elsewhere.
26As before, we control for prior attainment, SES, ethnicity, TTWA at age 16 and other background characteristics
listed in Section 2.2. In regressions for graduates, we also control for HE institution and subject.
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Note: In estimating the ‘moving premiums’, we control for prior attainment, SES, ethnicity, TTWA at age 16 and other
background characteristics listed in Section 2.2, as well as HE institution and subject. Includes data from the 2002–05
GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only counted as such if they have obtained
their degrees before age 27. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped.
By way of comparison, Figure 18 presents estimates of the moving premium for non-graduates.
The results are strikingly different: non-graduates who move earn no more than similar non-
graduates who do not move. If anything, the overall estimate for men is slightly negative. As
with the estimates for graduates, there is very little variation in the moving premium across SES
and ethnic groups, again with the exception of South Asian women, for whom there is a large and
significantly negative ‘premium’.
The finding that non-graduates do not appear to gain from moving might explain why they are
less mobile. We know that wages at the bottom of the distribution are much more similar across
regions than at the top (Agrawal and Phillips, 2020), and at the very bottom, the minimum wage
37
is the same everywhere. Our finding is also likely to reflect where non-graduates are moving –
as we saw in Section 4.1, non-graduates do not tend to move to London and other major cities.
We should note, however, that there may be economic benefits from moving that are not reflected
in earnings. For example, Papoutsaki et al. (2020) find that people who move are more likely
to be employed, and more likely to work in professional jobs. Non-graduates may thus benefit
economically from moving even if they do not achieve higher earnings.













































Note: In estimating the ‘moving premiums’, we control for prior attainment, SES, ethnicity, TTWA at age 16 and other
background characteristics listed in Section 2.2. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14
to 2016/17 tax years. Individuals are counted as non-graduates unless they have obtained a degree before age 27.
Individuals observed to be in full-time education are dropped, and the graduation year is dropped for those studying
part-time.
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4.7 The moving premium by type of higher education degree
We have seen that the gains from moving are remarkably similar across graduates from different
demographic groups. We now consider how they vary by where and what graduates study. Fig-
ure 19 presents moving premiums across different degree types, again holding the background
characteristics of students fixed.
We see that there is very little variation in premiums across different types of institutions –
graduates from Russell Group universities gain no more, or less, than otherwise similar graduates
from less selective universities. However, estimated graduate premiums vary hugely by subject.
All else equal, there are no large earnings differences between movers and non-movers who grad-
uated in nursing, education and social care. This is likely to reflect the fact that wages in these
occupations are set nationally. Perhaps unsurprisingly, graduates in education and social care are
also least likely to move away from their area of origin, conditional on characteristics (as we saw
earlier in Figure 9).
At the other end of the spectrum, there are large earnings premiums associated with moving
for both male and female graduates of law, technology, languages, business and economics. Grad-
uates of veterinary sciences also appear to see large gains from moving, though estimates for men
are very imprecise. The starkest example is law, where men who move earn nearly 20% more
than men who stay in their area of origin, controlling for differences in background characteris-
tics.27 This suggests that moving to certain areas might be necessary to fully take advantage of the
returns to these degrees.
The large moving premiums in law, technology, languages, business and economics are in-
triguing and merit further investigation. Following similar logic to that set out in Section 4.4 on
graduate earnings premiums in different parts of the country, we might expect graduates in these
subjects to move more, thus increasing labour supply where their skills are demanded, driving
down the average returns to moving. To elaborate on this, if law firms in one area were willing
to pay very high salaries, we would expect large numbers of law graduates to move to that area.
This, in turn, would bring down lawyers’ salaries in the area, reducing the premium to moving.
One possible explanation is that high-paying jobs in these sectors are disproportionately con-
27The equation is estimated in logs, and the estimated moving premium is around 0.18 log points. This implies a
change of e0.18 − 1 = 19.7%.
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centrated in London. If people are particularly averse to moving to London for other reasons
(such as the high cost of housing), this might prevent market forces from driving down the pre-
miums from moving there. Figure A11 in Appendix A1 provides some evidence to support this
hypothesis by showing that the moving premiums for many subjects are much higher for moves
to London than for moves to other places.
Finally, there are a couple of interesting cases – notably, computing and pharmacology – where
the payoff from moving is much larger for men than it is for women. It is unclear from our data
why this would be the case, but it could be something that merits further investigation.



















































































Note: In estimating the ‘moving premiums’, we control for prior attainment, SES, ethnicity, TTWA at age 16 and other
background characteristics listed in Section 2.2, as well as HE institution and subject. Includes data from the 2002–05
GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only counted as such if they have obtained
their degrees before age 27. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped. A list of universities
in each of the four categories can be found in Britton et al. (2020c).
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5 What are the implications for regional inequality?
We have seen so far that higher education is associated with greater mobility, and that graduates
on average move towards wealthier cities, away from poorer areas. This has important implica-
tions for the distribution of skills across the country and, in turn, for regional inequalities. In this
section, we look more closely at which areas gain and lose graduates through migration, and the
effect this has on the geographical concentration of skills.
There are large differences in education and skills across the UK (Bell, Blundell and Machin,
2019), which are responsible for many of the spatial disparities in economic and social outcomes
we see today (Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006; Gibbons, Overman and
Pelkonen, 2014). These partly reflect differences in education outcomes across areas: children in
more deprived areas are less likely to do well in school (Social Mobility Commission, 2017). But the
migration patterns we have described above also play a role in exacerbating regional inequalities.
Figure 20 plots the share of individuals who obtained a degree among those who live in a
TTWA at age 27 (on the vertical axis) against the share of graduates among those who grew up
in a TTWA (on the horizontal axis). If no-one moved, the two measures would coincide, and all
TTWAs would lie on the 45-degree line. Looking across the horizontal axis, we see that access to
higher education varies substantially across TTWAs. Less than 20% of those in our cohorts who
grew up in Wisbech (in North Cambridgeshire) and Grimsby (in North East Lincolnshire) went
on to obtain a degree, compared with over 40% of children who grew up in Tunbridge Wells (in
Kent) and High Wycombe (in Buckinghamshire). On top of this, Grimsby and Wisbech further
lose graduates through migration. We see this looking at the vertical axis: only around 12% of
individuals from our cohort of young adults living in these areas at age 27 have degrees.
In terms of numbers, the place that overwhelmingly gains the most graduates through migra-
tion is London – an area that already ‘produces’ a high share of graduates. Brighton, Leeds, Bristol
and Bath are also relatively high-skilled places (with above-average higher education participa-
tion rates) that gain even more graduates through migration. In contrast, rural areas on average
‘produce’ fewer graduates and further lose graduates through migration. The overall effect of mi-
gration is to increase the geographical concentration of skills. Figure A12 in Appendix A1 shows
that the concentration of graduates across TTWAs – based on the commonly used index of dissim-
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ilarity and the Herfindahl–Hirschman index – substantially increases as a result of migration.
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Note: The figure plots the share of individuals who obtained a degree among those who live in a TTWA at age 27 (on
the vertical axis) against the share of graduates among those who grew up in a TTWA (on the horizontal axis). Areas in
the top left of the figure gain (future) graduates as a share of population, and areas in the bottom right of the figure lose
graduates as a share of the population. The size of the circles represents the age 16 population of each TTWA. Includes
data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years.
The areas that lose and gain graduates can be clearly seen in Figure 21, which maps the change
in graduate share resulting from migration across TTWAs (the difference between the horizontal
and vertical axis values from Figure 20). Graduates flow to London, Brighton, Bristol and Leeds
– the areas marked in red. In contrast, migration reduces the graduate share in the North and
coastal areas. Given that these places are already relatively deprived, migration further exacer-
bates regional inequalities.
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Figure 21: Change in share of (future) graduates in TTWA, age 16 to age 27










Note: Net gain is the percentage point difference between the share of 16-year-olds from the area who went on to be
graduates and the share of 27-year-olds who live in the area who are graduates. Black dots signify universities. A small
number of institutions with campuses spread across multiple TTWAs are not shown.
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Figure 22: Composition of graduate share in TTWAs with universities
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Note: ‘From there’ refers to the share of 27-year-olds living in each TTWA who have obtained a degree and were living
in the same TTWA at age 16. ‘University’ refers to the share of 27-year-olds living in each TTWA who have obtained a
degree from a university in that TTWA and were not living in the same TTWA at age 16. ‘Neither’ refers to the share of
27-year-old graduates living in each TTWA who have not obtained a degree from a university in that TTWA and were
not living in that TTWA at age 16. Only TTWAs that contain a university are included in the figure (a small number
of institutions with campuses spread across multiple TTWAs are disregarded). Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE
cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years.
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Individual universities are marked with dots in Figure 21. We see that the only area without a
university to gain graduates is the Leamington TTWA, likely due to the proximity of Leamington
Spa to the University of Warwick. This suggests that there may be some relationship between
the presence of a university and an area’s ability to attract and retain graduates. Indeed, among
graduates who move away from their home TTWA for university and do not return by age 27,
around a quarter stay in the TTWA of their university (see Table A1 in Appendix A1).
Figure 22 shows that graduates who attended university in the area can be an important source
of graduate in-migration.28 In Sheffield, Liverpool, Canterbury, Plymouth, Newcastle and Lin-
coln, more than half of graduate in-migrants also went to university in the area. That said, it is
clear from Figure 21 that not all university towns attract graduates, and any correlation between
place of study and subsequent place of residence could also reflect preferences for areas that drive
both university choice and location decisions. How places can attract and retain graduates, and
what role local universities can play, is an important avenue for further research.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that higher education is associated with greater mobility, even controlling for dif-
ferences in background characteristics between graduates and non-graduates. Graduates tend to
move to London and other affluent cities, away from poorer areas, and those who move experi-
ence large earnings gains relative to otherwise similar graduates who do not move. This suggests
that higher education allows people to move to better labour markets, reducing inequality of op-
portunity between individuals who grow up in different areas.
However, individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds and ethnic minorities are less
mobile even controlling for background characteristics, and the relationship between higher ed-
ucation and mobility is much weaker for these groups. In addition, low-SES graduates who do
move are less likely to move to London and other big cities, and many ethnic minority graduates
move away from London. This suggests that graduate mobility may not reduce – and may even
exacerbate – inequalities between groups. Patterns of graduate mobility also increase the concen-
28Figure A17 in Appendix A3 gives the same figure when adjusting for misrecording using our estimated parameters.
These results suggest that Figure 22 is likely to understate the share of in-migrants and overstate the share of graduates
from a place substantially but not dramatically.
45
tration of skills in cities, where participation in higher education is often already high, thereby
increasing geographical inequality.
In addition to our main findings, we uncover a number of interesting results that merit further
research. First, we find that the graduate wage premium appears to vary substantially across the
country. It is worth investigating whether this result is robust to further controls and procedures
to account for selection on unobservable characteristics – and if so, what implications it may have
for productivity or incentives for young people to invest in higher education in different places.
Second, we estimate huge variation in gains from moving across subjects, and in some cases be-
tween male and female graduates in specific subjects. Further research is needed to understand
the drivers of this variation, perhaps in relation to the level of wage inequality within sectors and
the extent to which sectors are spatially concentrated. Third, while we find a general correlation
between average earnings in an area and its ability to attract and retain graduates, some places
stand out. Brighton, Leeds and Bristol in particular gain more graduates through migration than
we might expect, while other cities such as Manchester and Birmingham do not. The presence
of local universities might play a role, but does not seem to be sufficient. In the context of the
‘levelling up’ agenda, it is worth investigating what attributes of cities are attractive to graduates
in order to better enable left-behind places to attract and retain skills.
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Appendix
A1 Additional figures and table













































2002 2003 2004 2005
2006 2007 2008 2009
Note: Includes data from the 2002–09 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2012/13 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education are dropped,
and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time.
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Note: Includes data from the 2002–09 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2012/13 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education are dropped,
and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time. People living in London at age 16 are
dropped.
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Age 16 Age 27
Non−graduates who move
Note: The left-hand figure shows the area types where non-graduates lived at age 16, and compares these with where
they live at age 27, showing the flows of non-graduates to and from each area type. The right-hand figure only shows
origin and destination area type for non-graduates who move TTWA between ages 16 and 27. Individuals observed to
be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped, as are observations for part-time students if they graduate at age 27.
Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years.
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Note: Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education are dropped,
and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time.
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Note: Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education are dropped,
and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time.
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Estimate 95% CI Raw difference
Note: Shows coefficients from a linear probability regression model. Only those who have obtained a degree by age 27
are included in the regression. The model regresses an indicator for ‘moving’ – defined as living in a different TTWA
at age 27 from at age 16 – on all of the observable characteristics shown in the figure, prior attainment, HE institution,
subject choice, TTWA of origin fixed effects and other controls listed in Section 2.2. The reference categories are female,
highest SES and White British. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax
years. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped.
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Estimate 95% CI Raw difference
Note: Shows coefficients from a linear probability regression model. Only individuals who have obtained a degree
by age 27 and are also living in a different TTWA at age 27 from at age 16 are included in the regression. The model
regresses an indicator for ‘living in a major city’ on all of the observable characteristics shown in the figure, prior
attainment, HE institution, subject choice, TTWA of origin fixed effects and other controls listed in Section 2.2. The
reference categories are female, highest SES and White British. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from
the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped.
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Note: Estimated effects on moving on the vertical axis are the estimated TTWA of origin fixed effects from a linear
probability regression model which regresses an indicator for ‘moving’ – defined as living in a different TTWA at age
27 from at age 16 – on a graduate dummy and the background characteristics listed in Section 2.2. Includes data from
the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Mean annual pay for each TTWA is the simple
average of reported mean earnings from the 2014 to 2017 vintages of the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE).
r2 is the proportion of the variance in the estimated effects on moving that is predictable by mean annual pay in a TTWA
and an intercept (this is the square of the Pearson correlation coefficient).
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Note: Change in the share of graduates is the percentage point difference between the share of 16-year-olds from the
area who went on to be graduates and the share of 27-year-olds who live in the area who are graduates. The latter
share has been adjusted holding the non-graduate population constant at the age 16 level, in order to isolate the effect
of graduate moves. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Mean
annual pay for each TTWA is the simple average of reported mean earnings from the 2014 to 2017 vintages of the Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). r2 is the proportion of the variance in the change in the graduate share that is
predictable by mean annual pay in a TTWA and an intercept (this is the square of the Pearson correlation coefficient).
58















































-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3
Estimated graduate premium (age 27)
Major city Other city Rural
Note: The change in the share of graduates is the percentage point difference between the share of 16-year-olds from
the area who went on to be graduates and the share of 27-year-olds who live in the area who are graduates. ‘Graduate
premiums’ are estimated using a regression of earnings on a graduate dummy, interacted with TTWA at age 27, plus
controls for background characteristics and school attainment as listed in Section 2.2, fully interacted with a gender
dummy. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. r2 is the proportion
of the variance in the change in the graduate share that is predictable by the estimated graduate premium and an
intercept (this is the square of the Pearson correlation coefficient).
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Note: ‘Moving to London’ refers to the estimated ‘moving premiums’ for students of different subjects from moving to
London. ‘Moving elsewhere’ refers to the ‘moving premium’ from moving anywhere else. In estimating the ‘moving
premiums’, we control for prior attainment, SES, ethnicity, TTWA at age 16 and other background characteristics listed
in Section 2.2, as well as HE institution and subject. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14
to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only counted as such if they have obtained their degrees before age 27. Individuals
observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped.
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Place of origin Place of residence (age 27)
Note: The figure plots two commonly used measures of concentration for graduates, both by place of origin and place
of residence at age 27, calculated at the TTWA level. The index of dissimilarity can be interpreted as the share of
graduates who would need to move to even out the share of graduates across TTWAs. The Herfindahl–Hirschman
Index (HHI) directly measures the concentration of graduates across TTWAs (in absolute terms rather than relative to
non-graduates). Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Individuals
observed to be in full-time education are dropped, and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying
part-time.
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Table A1: Mobility of graduates by whether went to university in home TTWA (age 27)
Left TTWA to study Stayed in TTWA to study
of which of which
share returned stayed other share stayed left
Gender
Women 0.77 0.63 0.10 0.27 0.23 0.88 0.12
Men 0.79 0.65 0.10 0.25 0.21 0.90 0.10
Socio-economic background
Bottom quintile 0.55 0.75 0.09 0.17 0.45 0.92 0.08
2nd quintile 0.70 0.69 0.10 0.21 0.30 0.90 0.10
3rd quintile 0.78 0.66 0.10 0.24 0.22 0.88 0.12
4th quintile 0.83 0.63 0.10 0.27 0.17 0.87 0.13
Top quintile 0.88 0.59 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.84 0.16
Ethnicity
White British 0.83 0.62 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.87 0.13
White Other 0.70 0.65 0.11 0.23 0.30 0.91 0.09
Black Caribbean 0.56 0.79 0.08 0.13 0.44 0.93 0.07
Black African 0.63 0.77 0.09 0.14 0.37 0.93 0.07
Black Other 0.60 0.75 0.10 0.15 0.40 0.93 0.07
Indian 0.67 0.82 0.05 0.13 0.33 0.92 0.08
Pakistani 0.52 0.85 0.05 0.10 0.48 0.92 0.08
Bangladeshi 0.34 0.80 0.07 0.13 0.66 0.93 0.07
Chinese 0.71 0.67 0.12 0.20 0.29 0.92 0.08
Other 0.72 0.67 0.10 0.23 0.28 0.89 0.11
Note: The second, third and fourth columns are shares among those who leave their home TTWA to study and thus
add up to 1. ‘Returned’ refers to those whose age 27 address is in the same TTWA as their address at age 16. ‘Stayed’
refers to those whose age 27 address is in the same TTWA as their university. ‘Other’ refers to those whose age 27
address is neither in the same TTWA as their address at age 16 nor in the same TTWA as their university. The last two
columns are shares among those who stay in their home TTWA to study and thus also add up to 1. ‘Stayed’ refers to
those whose age 27 address is in the same TTWA as their address at age 16 (which is also the TTWA of their university).
‘Left’ refers to those whose age 27 address is not in the same TTWA as their address at age 16 (and thus also not in the
same TTWA as their university). The two columns headed ’share’ also add up to 1. Includes data from the 2002–05




In order to quantify the scale of misrecording based on our two measures of the share of people
living with their parents at each age – from our DWP data (LEO) and from the FRS – we set up a
simple model of misrecording and estimate it using the generalised method of moments (GMM).
Suppose σt is the share of students actually living with their parents in period t. σ∗t is the share
of people recorded in the DWP as living in the same LSOA at age 16, which we assume to be the
same as the share of people recording their parents’ address. t = 0 is the period at age 16 when all
students live with their parents, so σ0 = σ∗0 = 1. t = 1, . . . , T are in each case the tax year t years
after graduation.
Assume further that people never move back in with their parents after living away in any
period t ≥ 1. All students who live with their parents in any period t correctly record their address
with HMRC. Students who do not live with their parents either record their correct address or their
parents’ address. In the first period after moving, a share α record their correct address. In each
subsequent period, a share ρ of the remainder update their address to the correct address. Under
these assumptions, σ∗t is given by




(σs−1 − σs)(1− ρ)t−s. (1)
Note that it is possible from this to work out {σt}Tt=1 from {σ∗t }Tt=1 (and vice versa) if α and ρ are
known.
We can then estimate the parameter vector θ = (σ1, . . . , σT, α, ρ) using GMM. We use the sam-
ple moment conditions
σt − σ̂t = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T (2)
where σ̂t is the share living with parents recorded in the FRS and




(σs−1 − σs)(1− ρ)t−s = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T (3)
where σ̂∗t is the share living in the same LSOA in LEO. Moment conditions are weighted using the
diagonal weight matrix W = diag(Var(σ̂1)−1, . . . , Var(σ̂T)−1, Var(σ̂∗1 )
−1, . . . , Var(σ̂∗T)
−1).
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When we took this model to the data, we found that the point estimate for the updating pa-
rameter ρ was near zero or even negative (depending on the group for which it was estimated),
and imposing ρ = 0 did not substantially affect the fit of the model. We have therefore set ρ = 0
in our preferred specification. In that case, (3) simplifies to
σ̂∗t − (1− α + ασt) = 0 for t = 1, . . . , T. (4)
We also found no substantial differences between men and women; as a result, while we use
separate moments for each gender, we restrict α to be the same across genders in our preferred
specification.
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Years after leaving full-time education
Men
Estimated true share Share in FRS
Share in DWP data
Note: ‘Estimated true share’ refers to σt, ‘Share in FRS’ refers to σ̂t and ‘Share in DWP data’ refers to σ̂∗t . Includes data
from the 2002–09 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2012/13 to 2016/17 tax years.
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As shown in Figure A13, this model fits fairly well for graduates. We obtain a value for the
share of people updating their address of α = 0.725. This implies that the true number of people
moving may be around 40% higher than the administrative records would suggest.
Our model fits less well for non-graduates, who are substantially younger on average when
they leave full-time education. Our conjecture is that this is explained by disproportional rates of
non-response to the FRS among young people who do not live with their families. It is well known
that young people are less likely to respond to surveys in general, but as the FRS is a household
survey, young people living at home will be counted as long as their parents respond.
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Years after leaving full-time education
Men
Estimated true share Expected share in FRS
Actual share in FRS Share in DWP data
Note: ‘Estimated true share’ refers to σt, ‘Expected share in FRS’ refers to σ̃t, ‘Actual share in FRS’ refers to σ̂t and ‘Share
in DWP data’ refers to σ̂∗t . Includes data from the 2002–09 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2012/13 to 2016/17 tax years.
To account for this effect, we introduce another parameter (δ) into the model, which represents
the share of non-graduates not living at home who respond to the FRS (relative to the share whose
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parents respond). Then (2) becomes











When we estimated this augmented model on the data for non-graduates, we obtained a value
of α = 0.703 for the share of people correctly updating their address, which is very close to the
value obtained for graduates. We get δ = 0.531 for the (relative) share of young people living away
from home responding to the FRS, which seems realistic. Figure A14 shows the fit of the model.
While the model has some trouble fitting the FRS data in the first year after full-time education
(which is likely related to limitations of the administrative school records we hold), the fit is good
overall. While these results for non-graduates are likely less reliable than the results for graduates
given the potential problems with non-response in the FRS for very young people, it is reassuring
that the estimated share of people with correctly updated addresses (α) is roughly similar to what
we obtain for graduates.
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A3 Figures adjusted for misrecording





















































Note: Includes data from the 2002–09 GCSE cohorts, and from the 2012/13 to 2016/17 tax years. Graduates are only
counted as such once they have obtained their degrees. Individuals observed to be in full-time education are dropped,
and the graduation year is dropped for non-graduates studying part-time. Results have been adjusted to account for
misrecording using the estimated parameters from our misrecording model.
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Age 16 Age 27
All graduates (adjusted)
Note: The left-hand figure shows the area types where graduates lived at age 16, and compares these with where they
live at age 27, showing the flows of graduates to and from each area type. The right-hand figure shows the same data
adjusted to account for misrecording using the estimated parameters from our misrecording model. Those observed to
be in full-time education at age 27 are excluded from the chart. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from
the 2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped.
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Figure A17: Composition of graduate share in TTWAs with universities, adjusted
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Note: ‘From there’ refers to the share of 27-year-olds living in each TTWA who have obtained a degree and were living
in the same TTWA at age 16. ‘University’ refers to the share of 27-year-olds living in each TTWA who have obtained a
degree from a university in that TTWA and were not living in the same TTWA at age 16. ‘Neither’ refers to the share of
27-year-old graduates living in each TTWA who have not obtained a degree from a university in that TTWA and were
not living in that TTWA at age 16. Only TTWAs that contain a university are included in the figure (a small number of
institutions with campuses spread across multiple TTWAs are disregarded). Results have been adjusted to account for
misrecording using the estimated parameters from our misrecording model. To facilitate comparisons with Figure 22,
the ordering of TTWAs from that figure has been retained. Includes data from the 2002–05 GCSE cohorts, and from the
2013/14 to 2016/17 tax years. Individuals observed to be in full-time education at age 27 are dropped.
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